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CHINA’S MATURING NAVY
Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired)

T

he East Asia security environment in which China is emerging demands that
the matter of a maturing Chinese navy be put in a political context. Tension
across the Taiwan Strait has recently relaxed. In Beijing, the leaders of economically successful and internationally active China do not want to jeopardize the
nation’s prospects for a bright future by initiating military conflict with Taiwan
and the United States—quite the contrary. In Taipei, despite profound disagreement with Beijing and a major stir in domestic politics, a cautious posture in relations with Beijing now prevails. So, remarkably, amid deep, persistent, and mutual
distrust, the current prospects for avoiding conflict across the Taiwan Strait are
good. Well-informed Chinese officials and prestigious
Rear Admiral McVadon is a consultant on East Asia seAmericans who have had exchanges with senior Chicurity affairs and part-time director of Asia-Pacific
nese leaders confirm the relaxed circumstances and exStudies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, spepress the conviction that Beijing is confident about the
cializing in international security factors shaping the
Asia-Pacific region. During a thirty-five-year career in
situation as Chinese leaders see it developing and that
the U.S. Navy, he served in a variety of operational and
Taiwan, again content with the status quo, will remain
policy planning positions, including commanding officer
of a Pacific Fleet P-3C squadron; Deputy Director for
measured in its actions. War across the Taiwan Strait is
Strategy, Plans and Policy, on the Navy Staff; Comnot looming.
mander, Iceland Defense Force; and U.S. defense and
Nevertheless, Beijing is, by modernizing its milinaval attaché at the American embassy in Beijing. Recent publications include the book China’s Foreign
tary, ensuring that things will not go awry in Taiwan,
Military Relations (1999). He holds an MS in internathat its policy of intimidation continues to work. The
tional affairs from George Washington University and
indisputable reality is that this military—the People’s
is a distinguished graduate of the National War College,
the Naval War College, and the Naval Postgraduate
Liberation Army (or PLA), and particularly its naval
School.
component, the PLA Navy (or PLAN)—is growing
greatly in capability; further, it is a growing concern
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to defense and naval leaders in Washington, D.C., and other capitals, including
Tokyo and Taipei. In a time of American preoccupation with the global war on
terrorism, it is appropriate to draw attention to the crucial features of this modernization of components of the PLA. Beijing, if the “Taiwan problem” were to
suffer a dramatic reversal, would have available an impressive force acquired for
this purpose. If that force were effectively deployed, it would be sufficient in
terms of hardware to undertake a two-pronged, PLA Navy–led campaign, with a
big maritime component, against Taiwan and U.S. forces in a fashion that could
be termed “jointness with Chinese characteristics.”
A MILITARY TO DEFEND AND DETER
When pressed on the subject, Chinese officials began some months ago to deliver both publicly and privately (to the author and undoubtedly many others)
the consistent message that the military budget is not excessive, manpower is
1
shrinking, and the newly modernized PLA is not a threat. Chinese characterize
the PLA instead as a deterrent force—as were U.S. forces during the Cold War,
they are quick to remind. When pressed further, they accept unabashedly the retort that the modernization surge is, so far, narrowly focused on the Taiwan contingency. It is directed to deterring Taiwan’s movement toward independence,
which they consider the top “threat to Chinese sovereignty,” and to curbing the
ability of the United States to intervene rapidly and effectively were China com2
pelled, as Beijing perceives it, to use military force against Taiwan.
So the concern is that hard-liners in Beijing, obsessed by the “Taiwan problem,” might not allow prudence to prevail in decision making in a crisis and,
consequently, could order the use of military force because of what they perceive
as intolerable “splittist” conduct by Taipei. In evaluating the risks of an imprudent decision by Beijing, it might be asked rhetorically whether the current Chinese Communist Party is capable of as bad a choice in a future Taiwan crisis as
most observers think the party made with the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural
Revolution, and the actions in 1989 now referred to simply as “Tiananmen.”
Some observers increasingly find reason to be optimistic, but it is hard to offer
unqualified assurance that Beijing could not again make a very bad decision.
It is the result of decisions obviously made several years ago that a new, modern, and much more capable PLA Navy has, along with the Air Force and 2nd Artillery Corps (the ballistic- and long-range-cruise-missile force), been acquired
and deployed. A stunning modernization effort continues. Regardless of how
Beijing’s intentions are viewed, the surge in PLA modernization has radically
changed the military situation for Taiwan. Taipei is more than ever forced to
look to Washington to cope with this more advanced, capable PLA, with the
strategic depth of huge China behind it.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/7
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Moreover, the PLA now hopes to bring to reality concepts its strategists have
written about, such as how an inferior force can prevail against a superior opponent—that is, China versus the United States. Specifically, the critical aspects of a
new navy and the highly significant synergies that may develop between it and the
missile and air forces warrant full attention, because they are directed specifically at
deterring, delaying, or complicating timely and effective American access and intervention. U.S. forces must be able, should the Taiwan pot boil over, to turn the tables
and deter Beijing from using its proclaimed deterrent forces—or to ensure a favorable outcome if mutual deterrence fails. The ultimate American goal, however,
should be to make the chances of conflict even less than they are. Understanding the
important developments described here seems a necessary step toward that goal.
STARTING WITH QUESTIONS
The following questions and answers may be an unusual way to begin probing the
specific naval aspects of the issue, but they focus on an often neglected, but arguably the most surprising, single PLAN acquisition program—its bold move to
build quickly a modern nuclear submarine force despite its troubled past in this
arena. These incisive questions—posed to the author in 2005 by experts on the
Chinese submarine force—are especially useful in that they take the PLA’s Taiwan
obsession fully into account but also look beyond. They reveal the layers of complexity and uncertainty inherent in the very rapid and impressive modernization
of the PLA Navy—a navy that, it is worth emphasizing, is arguably the only one in
today’s world that the U.S. Navy must deter or be able to defeat, but also a navy
that under different circumstances could become a high-seas partner.

• How “mature” is China’s navy? Does the PLAN have the requisite human
capital, organizational practices, and exercise regimen to become a worldclass fleet? The PLAN is most nearly mature with respect to platforms and
weapons but, approximately in the order listed, progressively less so in
human capital, organizational practices, and exercise regimen. It is working
to become better in each.

• Are nuclear submarines a good fit for China’s emerging naval strategy? Will the
balance of forces (i.e., nuclear versus diesel submarines) change in the future?
The currently emerging balance is a good fit, especially vis-à-vis China’s
current set of potential adversaries. If the Taiwan problem were eliminated
somehow, a shift toward nuclear submarines to protect more distant sealanes would be a logical option. This makes the PLAN nuclear submarine
program a possible bellwether for future naval policy more generally.

• What are the trends in undersea warfare and antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
in the western Pacific region? The superiority of the U.S. nuclear submarine
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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force will continue; however, the Chinese are apparently developing
ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads and terminal seekers to hit
ships at sea. This capability to lob numerous accurate ballistic missile
warheads high over the heads of all defenders could effectively circumvent
the anticipated quiet and capable U.S. nuclear attack submarines. The
PLAN has previously seen these submarines as all but impossible to
penetrate with its own submarines (or surface ships) to reach the carriers
and cruisers it wants to disable. Despite the PLAN’s ineptitude at
antisubmarine warfare, short of a (plausible) major breakthrough, the
trend in submarine/ASW competition is going China’s way: the PLAN’s
submarine numbers and diversity trump, or at least could saturate, likely
ASW opposition for the foreseeable future, especially in case of the short
war Beijing contemplates. With respect to Taiwan’s ASW capability (almost
an oxymoron now), the Republic of China (ROC) Navy would still have to
learn to use its P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft after getting them; its
prospective new submarine force of eight diesel submarines, if approved
for acquisition (as currently seems unlikely), would be a decade or more
from operational status and even then inadequate for antisubmarine
warfare against what would by then have become a remarkably numerous,
diverse, and advanced PLAN submarine force.

• What strategic dilemmas might Washington encounter as a result of China’s
new nuclear submarine force? Beijing’s smug confidence that Washington
must always keep in mind China’s status as a nuclear power will be
reinforced if the PLAN is successful with its ongoing program to build
several modern Jin-class (Project 094) nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
submarines (SSBNs). Its sequential construction of Shang-class (Project
093) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) adds the component of
reach (range and speed) to the existing qualities of numbers of its nuclear
and conventional submarines, as well as quietness for a growing portion of
that force and potency of weapons for a similar portion—especially for the
new Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia, with their long-range,
supersonic, sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). A “new
PLAN” with these new nuclear-powered submarines and stunning array of
other new and modern platforms and weapons is highly likely to view itself
in a different strategic light, as yet unrevealed, than has the “old PLAN.”
A MATURING BUT STILL ADOLESCENT NAVY
Harking back to the title of this article, the PLA Navy might best be described as
an adolescent rather than mature navy, with the caution that adolescents can
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exhibit qualities across the range from juvenile to adult, often commit crimes
that warrant treatment as adults, and mature unpredictably. To extend the adolescence analogy a bit more, the PLAN is growing remarkably in size and
strength, even “bulking up” (in the American vernacular); all observers remark
3
how it has grown since the last time they saw it.
Simply fielding more modern units does not make the PLAN a truly modern
operational force. The limits on how China’s and the navy’s leaders are able to
employ their new capabilities represent significant shortcomings, and success in
the effort to overcome them is far from assured. Put another way, the PLAN has
matured remarkably insofar as acquiring platforms and equipment (ships, submarines, aircraft, radars, and so on) and weapons (antiship cruise missiles, air
defense missiles, torpedoes, and the like) is concerned, but this “new PLA Navy”
has not matured fully in exercising its forces and developing the command and
control capabilities, coordination means, and intelligence and targeting support
needed to make that force fully operational—especially in comparison with its
4
most important and most capable potential adversary, the U.S. Navy.
Better officers are on the way up—if they make it. The PLAN recognizes that
to conduct complex joint operations, exercise greatly enhanced command and
control, and effectively employ modern weapons it needs a better-educated,
5
more worldly officer corps, and it is striving to do that, or so it says. PLAN officers are taking more prominent positions in institutions that do strategic thinking; for example, in two recent firsts for naval officers, Admiral Zhang Dingfa
headed the Academy of Military Science (he now serves as the commander of the
PLAN), and Rear Admiral Yang Yi is still director of the Institute of Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University in Beijing. The PLA Navy seeks offi6
cers educated in first-rate civilian universities. The emphasis, however, appears
7
to be on specific technical and scientific education; this approach neglects, it
seems, the parallel need for specialists in operations, security issues, strategic
8
studies, and international affairs.
Details aside, an important and yet unanswered question is whether the PLA
Navy wants officers better educated or considers them better Red. That is, will
competent, forward-thinking officers be selected for flag rank, or will party loyalty and personal connections continue to prevail as the paramount selection
9
criteria? This author has lectured and conferred at the National Defense University and other PLA institutions on several occasions at which junior officers
asked all the questions and did all the talking while flag and general officers who
were students remained silent—at least in part, it appeared, for fear of being
outshone in these lively and insightful discussions. It would seem that at some
point the demands of a modern PLA will force the promotion of more of the officers who have all the intelligent questions and original thoughts.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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Organization is improving, but maybe not yet enough. The PLA Navy structure has been streamlined: naval aviation no longer stands alone as though an almost separate service; closer ties have been established with the PLAN’s marine
10
corps; and there are fewer layers in the chain of command. Nevertheless, the
author has observed and been told, there is still much deadwood at the top: individuals in green uniforms with two or more stars on their shoulders (PLA
ground-force generals) who persist in treating the PLAN as mostly an adjunct to
the army, and senior officers who, through lack of vision, fail to move decisively
toward true joint operations. These generals represent obstacles at a time when
real coordination with the 2nd Artillery Corps and the PLA Air Force would lead
to enormous advances in the ability to polish off Taiwan, threaten American intervention capabilities, and keep Japan off balance.
China’s navy is still failing to conduct exercises needed to develop its potential
capability. It continues to steam in the littoral for the most part. However, the
PLAN aspires to, and is erratically striving to conduct, training and exercises in
more distant waters; to make its training more like combat; to challenge itself in
exercises with active, maneuvering opposition forces; and otherwise to add realism to its training and exercise activity. It has even been so bold as to engage, in
August 2005, in a major multiphased exercise with the Russian Navy, a notable
advance beyond the minor, very basic exercises it has conducted with the French,
11
British, Australian, Pakistani, and Indian navies in recent years. A few years ago
the PLAN would not have participated in such exercises at all, fearing not only
prying (as well as spying) but embarrassment, that its shortcomings and backwardness would be revealed. Chinese naval leaders now seem sufficiently confident in their crews to seek international partners for exercises. (It will be
interesting to see if several unflattering post-exercise Russian media reports re12
juvenate concerns that bilateral exercises lead to ridicule and embarrassment.)
Still, the import of the Russian-Chinese exercise should not be overstated. It
was initially described by many as preparation for countering U.S. forces in the region. As later and more accurately described, however, it primarily demonstrated
that Sino-Russian bilateral relations are strong, especially military-to-military relations and arms sales. The exercise itself, held in waters just off the Shandong
Peninsula, was hardly a simulation of access denial against approaching U.S.
forces. Its significance in that respect would seem to be less direct. The fact that it
was held at all suggests that the Russians are more likely than we might have surmised to provide logistic and possibly intelligence support—specifically, to offer
to resupply missiles and spare parts for the key Russian weapon systems that
China would employ in combat with Taiwan and the United States.13
If it would be exaggeration, then, to assess this exercise as a sign of emergence
as a fully mature force, the PLAN is creeping toward real blue-water exercises
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/7
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with composite task forces including surface combatants, submarines, and aviation. So far, only in occasional and isolated distant submarine transits does it approximate the task of confronting an enemy, the U.S. Navy, that it might need to
14
keep at arm’s length, many hundreds of miles from the Chinese coast. In short,
the PLAN is not visibly conducting exercises, alone or with other services, that
rehearse confrontation with approaching U.S. Navy forces. The United States
should be alert to such a development with this new force, a force designed to
have the capabilities that could make such operations feasible.
ATTACKS FROM SEVERAL AXES
A new aspect of budding maturity, what could facetiously be termed “socialization,” is looming and demands attention—the prospect that the PLAN and the
2nd Artillery Corps could (and should) join hands to bolster the nation’s capability to attack Taiwan and pose a significantly greater and more diverse threat to
the ability of the United States to intervene in the region. The greatly increased
number and highly improved accuracy of China’s medium- and short-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs and SRBMs), plus strategic and technical writings,
suggest strongly that senior Chinese military leaders have recognized the enhancement of naval capabilities that would result from support by ballistic and
land-attack cruise missiles. China’s MRBMs (the DF-21C) and SRBMs (DF-15
and -11), with conventional warheads, have capabilities well beyond the psycho15
logical intimidation of Taiwan. Prospective synergies stem from the ability of
these potent missile arsenals to suppress Taiwan’s offensive and defensive air
power, support amphibious and airborne assaults on the island, strike American
bases in the region, and possibly damage heavily Taiwanese naval forces before
they could leave port.
However, the most important aspect of the increasing ballistic-missile threat
is the prospect that within a few years China may be able seriously to threaten
not only American land bases but also carrier strike groups, with maneuvering
16
reentry vehicles (MaRVs). MaRVed missiles, with conventional warheads,
would maneuver both to enhance warhead survival (defeat missile defenses)
17
and home on mobile (or stationary) targets. The implications for the PLAN of
this prospective 2nd Artillery capability are, of course, profound; they include
the ability to degrade U.S. air and missile defenses (including the Aegis systems
and carrier flight decks). That would allow follow-on attacks by layered, diverse,
and appropriately redundant PLAN submarine, air, and surface forces firing
large numbers of very modern and capable ASCMs, torpedoes, and even their
18
guns if the earlier attacks suppress most defenses. This and what follows are in
clear outline the sort of threat the PLA and PLA Navy wish to pose to U.S. Navy
forces. The precisely focused force the Chinese have built and what they have
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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written about its use leave no doubt about the concept—although there are
grave doubts about their ability to conduct it.
Whether, or how soon, the ballistic-missile threat becomes a factor in the
ability of the PLAN to deter, confuse, and delay or, alternatively, confront approaching U.S. Navy forces, the ability to launch lethal antiship-cruise-missile
attacks is an area where the PLAN is already near or at maturity—even if the targeting of American forces at which to launch them has not reached a mature
state. The PLAN became early a cruise-missile navy, as a way of overcoming
other deficiencies. Now it must be described as a modern cruise-missile navy, at
19
least with respect to the platforms and lethal, evasive missiles it is deploying.
The PLAN’s four newest classes of submarines, armed with potent ASCMs, fall
just below MaRVed ballistic missiles in the hierarchy of potential or emerging
threats to U.S. forces.
At the top of the submarine component of the overall threat are the eight new
Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines from Russia that are now being successively delivered to China. These submarines threaten carrier strike groups
through their ability to launch, while submerged over a hundred miles away, the
20
SS-N-27B/Sizzler antiship cruise missile. After a subsonic flight to the target
21
area, the SS-N-27B makes a supersonic, sea-skimming, evasive attack. It is described by its marketers and others as part of the best family of cruise missiles in
the world and, in the opinion of some, as able to defeat the U.S. Aegis air- and
22
missile-defense system that is central to the defense of carrier strike groups.
Shang-class (Type 093) SSNs are possible partners for the new Kilos. The surprisingly rapid construction of successive units in this new class of nuclear-powered
attack submarine implies special utility in a Taiwan contingency. The Shangs
could, if they prove sufficiently quiet and fast and are properly equipped with
sensors, be part of the net by which the PLAN locates and identifies approaching
23
U.S. carrier strike groups. If used this way, they could be part of a matrix composed of such detection and reporting means as satellites, merchant ships, and
even fishing boats with satellite phones.
Having served as part of the matrix that detects targets for the ballistic missiles and Kilos, the Shangs could then join with the Song- and Yuan-class nonnuclear submarines (SSs) in attacks against selected U.S. forces that have, as
expected in the sequenced PLA attack concept, suffered by that point significant
24
degradation of their air and missile defenses. These three classes of submarines
could carry out, from several attack axes, submerged launches of large salvoes of
subsonic, but still very capable, ASCMs. Of course, further follow-on attacks by
torpedoes cannot be discounted if they appear to be needed.
China’s other new nuclear-powered submarine program, the Jin-class (Project
094) ballistic-missile submarine, is primarily a part of China’s strategic deterrent,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/7
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25

but it will necessarily play a role as backdrop for this Taiwan scenario. As with
China’s modernized and augmented land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, Beijing can act more confidently in bold undertakings vis-à-vis the United
States when its strategic forces are more secure. With the Jins, Beijing is adding a
layer of insurance that American missile defenses could be saturated—and that
Washington would know it. Washington, of course, would have to take into account the fact that it is dealing with a capable nuclear power whose missiles have
become very mobile and hard to detect.
A DAUNTING ASW CHALLENGE
The success of the described PLAN submarine attacks using submerged-launch
antiship cruise missiles depends to some degree on thwarting or coping with
U.S. antisubmarine warfare capabilities, primarily aircraft (P-3Cs and to a lesser
extent shipborne helicopters) and SSNs. One method by which the Chinese
might complicate the ASW picture for the Americans is to use large numbers of
submarines, including the score or more older submarines—Han-class SSNs
and Romeo- and Ming-class SSs—which may be noisy but cannot be ignored. In
round numbers, the PLAN might, in a campaign where it has chosen the time to
ready the crews and initiate operations, be able to deploy more than twenty
26
modern SSNs and SSs and roughly the same number of older submarines. The
long range of the ASCMs carried by the new Kilos means that those submarines
need not come within a hundred miles of the target ships, if targeting information can be obtained remotely—greatly expanding the areas that American SSNs
and P-3Cs would have to search. The speed and practically unlimited underwater endurance of the new Shang SSNs could allow them to close targets
promptly to launch their shorter-range ASCMs after the initial attacks by longerrange missiles have degraded defenses.
The role of Taiwan in antisubmarine warfare deserves some attention. Taiwan’s current ASW capability is minimal. That capability might improve in the
foreseeable future were Taiwan to obtain from the United States the muchdiscussed P-3Cs, but that will depend on how seriously the ROC Navy pursues
the demanding task of learning how to do antisubmarine warfare with that aircraft. If it does that well, Taiwan’s P-3Cs might offer a measure of help in the
big ASW problem that the PLAN could create in the East China Sea and be27
yond. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force would offer another measure of assistance, if Tokyo were to make a political decision to involve its
forces in that way. All this said, China’s growing and improving submarine
fleet has outpaced U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese ASW in the difficult littoral
waters of the region, which generally favor submarines seeking to escape detection.28 Open-ocean areas may be a slightly riskier proposition for the PLAN’s
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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submarines, unless they actually achieve the elusive new levels of stealth to
which China aspires.
The previously described antisurface-warfare roles seem the most likely ones
for the PLAN’s new Shangs. It does not seem likely that the PLAN, inexperienced
compared to the U.S. Navy in undersea warfare, would use its few new SSNs—
precious to the Chinese but almost certainly not comparable to American SSNs
in capability and stealth—in an effort to strip the carrier groups of their submarine protection. So far, China has conceded that aspect of the game to the
United States and chosen to avoid dueling with the superior American submarines. By electing to develop a land-based ballistic-missile threat against
ships at sea, China is pursuing a path that could keep U.S. submarines from
blocking a critical initial attack on carrier strike groups. If in the event the ballisticmissile concept is not usable or fails in execution, the new Kilos with the
SS-N-27B, the many other submarines with ASCMs, and the increasingly capable PLA naval air force B-6s, FB-7s, and Su-30MK2s (to be mentioned in more
detail later) provide other alternatives that largely avoid American underwaterwarfare superiority. The point is that as the Shangs are introduced into the fleet,
it seems unlikely that they will be expected to take on American SSNs directly.
ENOUGH TO MAKE WASHINGTON PAUSE?
The intensity and persistence of PLAN attacks on U.S. Navy forces could well be
affected by Beijing’s perception of the fragility of a government on Taiwan subjected to a major assault from everything from ballistic missiles to aircraft to
special forces—and much more. It should be remembered that the primary purpose of denying or delaying access by U.S. forces would be to convince Taipei
that waiting for help is futile, that capitulation and negotiation—on Beijing’s
terms—are the only reasonable option. Success against U.S. forces is, therefore,
important largely for its effect on Taipei’s will to fight on. Success in such conflict would be sweetest for the PLA if the United States never became actively involved, concern about the capabilities of a modernized Chinese force having led
American leaders to delay or withhold carrier strike groups.
Returning from strategic considerations to the fight itself, were one to occur,
the Chinese can be expected next to deliver air-launched antiship cruise missiles
once the air defenses of the U.S. strike groups, and possibly regional bases as
well, are degraded. So this “layer” in the assault might be the PLA Navy Air
Force, attacking several hundred miles out to sea from China (in some cases
possibly much farther) with potent new air-launched ASCMs fired from new
aircraft from Russia (the Su-30MK2) and indigenous long-range B-6s (a new
version with new missiles) and FB-7 maritime interdiction aircraft, also with
29
new ASCMs. (Note how many times the word new appeared, correctly, in that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/7
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sentence.) Some PLA Air Force aircraft have similar capabilities. At a minimum,
the U.S. Navy would have to be concerned about vulnerability to such an attack
and, if it had, indeed, sustained damage, might feel it had to retreat. Beijing
would make sure that such a development was not lost on Taipei—and we are
seeking here to understand more fully how Beijing envisions a conflict with its
modernized forces, not necessarily the reality.
Surface combatants would be a final layer if a supposedly casualty-averse
Washington and teetering Taipei have not yet taken the point. Cleanup attacks
might in such a case be intended, with very capable ASCMs from the several new
or upgraded classes of destroyers and frigates. These warships are led, with respect to lethal firepower, by Russian Sovremennyys (soon to increase from two to
30
four) with supersonic, very evasive SS-N-22s. China has built or is building
enough new and modernized destroyers and frigates to form several modern
surface action groups, each capable of long-range attacks with almost equally lethal, although subsonic, ASCMs. Also—and here it is finally beginning to overcome a long-standing shortcoming—the PLA Navy is on the way to acquiring
31
good fleet air defenses using surface-to-air missile systems.
To capture succinctly the scope of the modernization of the surface combatant force, it can be said that the Chinese are now building and dramatically upgrading more classes of modern destroyers and frigates (these combatants
clearly outmatch those of Taiwan) than previous rates suggested they might ac32
quire ships in this decade.
The question that cannot now be answered is whether such a visible and
slow-moving force, even with dramatically improved air defense, could actually
engage even a damaged U.S. force and not be subject to devastating attack by
other American strike forces. There are, however, broader uncertainties for the
PLAN. As noted, the concepts outlined above emerge from the force Beijing is
building and from PLA doctrinal and other writing. Beijing has made hard decisions and executed expensive programs in the ongoing surge in the modernization of the PLA, with great emphasis on naval, air, and missile forces for such
operations as described. But surveillance and targeting support will be needed if
this force is to deter or confront American intervention efforts. To that end, it
appears that China is making significant efforts to gain a varied capability from
space, land, sea (including undersea), and air to locate, identify, track, and target
33
naval forces. China is lagging in this arena—real success in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) arena could take a decade—but one might
make a guess that some rudimentary, if not reliable and consistent, capability
could be cobbled together within a couple of years. In other words, there is impending danger that U.S. ships could be detected and effectively targeted. At
least equally important is whether China will be able to coordinate, command,
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and control such operations—that is, what of the C4* to go with the ISR? The
PLAN, although now more realistic and somewhat bolder in its training and exercises, as mentioned above, has not, for example, touted or otherwise given evidence of rehearsals of encounters with simulated carrier strike groups hundreds
of miles east of China, as it might do as part of a deterrence scheme.
There is, as described, no doubt about the acquisition of modern platforms
and threatening weapons, but there remains puzzlement as to whether and how
promptly the PLA Navy and the other crucial components of the PLA will make
all this capability truly operational. There is, nevertheless, an additional serious
corollary as to whether Beijing would feel compelled in some circumstance to
initiate hostilities against Taiwan and to confront U.S. forces even if preparations were short of optimal. It is hard to relax with respect to Beijing and Taiwan,
even if we think Chinese command and control is not up to the task.
This all adds up to a complex planning and execution challenge for an inexperienced PLA. In the scenario depicted above, it would be conducting two major
campaigns simultaneously: one to subdue Taiwan and the other to delay effective American intervention. The campaign against Taiwan would likely include
initial ballistic-missile and land-attack cruise-missile attacks; special forces,
fifth-column sabotage, and other such actions; information operations; major
air attacks; and amphibious and airborne assaults to secure lodgments to allow
occupation and control of Taiwan. The campaign against the United States, in
addition to being preceded by extensive efforts temporarily to cripple American
†
C4ISR, would, it should be remembered, consist of the described ballistic- and
cruise-missile attacks on carrier strike groups and possibly regional U.S. bases,
submarine attacks using various forms of antiship cruise missiles, and then selections from such follow-on options as ASCMs from air or surface forces. This
would be an extraordinarily demanding undertaking against a daunting foe for
a PLA leadership that has no experience in such combat.
The author’s guess is that the PLA would quickly succeed against Taiwan but
would probably falter against U.S. forces, against which it would encounter surprises, countermeasures, and other capabilities that would likely cause severe reversals. It must also be remembered, however, both that China’s best strategic
and military minds are working on these problems and that Beijing may feel it
has to act against Taiwan regardless of how challenging the prospect may appear.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the leaders of today’s modernized PLA would tell the
civilian leadership that their military is not ready. On the contrary, Beijing and
* C4: command, control, communications, and computers.
† C4ISR: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.
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the military have reason to believe that their forces are of such a nature as to
avoid American strengths, like SSNs and advanced C4ISR, and to make the most
of China’s strengths, such as its ballistic and cruise missiles and new conventional and nuclear submarine forces. The United States has the task not only to
deter this modern military that could embolden Chinese leaders but also, irresistibly yet subtly, to lead those leaders to the conviction that a decision to attack
Taiwan is not in China’s interests and would not likely result in reunification.
BEYOND “THE TAIWAN PROBLEM”
The PLA, especially the PLAN, now seems almost wholly, even obsessively, focused on the Taiwan problem. Two other factors should be taken into account,
however, and already seem to be intruding into Chinese strategic thinking. First,
an emerging China wants to build a military appropriate to the country that it is
becoming. Second, China’s all-important national economic growth, which
keeps the Communist Party in power, is dependent on ocean commerce. As the
PLA Navy tries to look beyond Taiwan or to decide what, even now, it should be
thinking about besides that, it sees a long-term capability to secure sea and land
routes for the flow of oil and natural gas, as well as other commodities, as a leading priority for China.
Will we see an organic air capability and a shift to more nuclear submarines?
A PLA Navy able to carry out that mission would almost certainly have some
form of organic air, so that it could effectively operate beyond the range of
land-based aircraft—far south in the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca,
even to the Indian Ocean. Current shipyard work on the incomplete aircraft carrier Varyag may be the start of a move in that direction, unlike so many Chinese
34
aircraft-carrier rumors of past decades. Another consideration could be a leaning toward submarines with greater range, speed, and independence from land
bases. This could mean that nuclear-powered attack submarines, despite the
added cost, might be preferred over diesel-electric or even air-independentpropulsion submarines.
SSNs are a possible bellwether of PLAN strategic thinking. China is now building and buying three classes of nonnuclear submarines: the Kilos, the Songs, and
the Yuans (some speculate about the exact character of the Yuan propulsion system). These submarines, along with the older Mings and remaining Romeos,
represent a major investment and will almost certainly constitute a majority of
the submarine fleet for the next fifteen years or more. It will, nevertheless, be
worthwhile to keep an eye on China’s success with the Shang attack class, to
ascertain whether it will feel the need suggested above for a faster, more independent force to protect distant sea lanes, and whether an emerging China will
follow the American example and diversify its SSN fleet to include land-attack
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cruise-missile capabilities and the ability to insert special forces—or possibly
other, novel capabilities needed in emerging missions for an emerged China.
China’s navy has developed in many remarkable ways, but perhaps the biggest
test of maturity is the bold attempt to leap to a new status in the prestigious and
unforgiving domain of nuclear submarines—where it had previously faltered.
To a significant degree, the success or failure of its new nuclear-powered submarines, the Jin-class ballistic-missile class as well as the Shangs, is likely to determine future decisions for the Chinese submarine force. The American
example in diversifying its nuclear submarines may also become a factor, in the
form of an example. The outcome for the nuclear submarine force could set the
tone for a navy that either comes to feel that it ranks with the best or, having
“tried out for the pros,” finds that once more it has faltered.
In any case, it is instructive to imagine a particularly intelligent and competent young Chinese naval officer just beginning his service. That junior officer
must today see the prospect, at least, of a promising career ahead as a nuclear
submariner in a globally capable “real navy”—the prospect of professional challenge and esteem comparable to that of an American counterpart. That in itself
is a remarkable and telling change from a few years ago, when serving on troubled Chinese nuclear submarines was thought by some to be as much a joke as a
job. Such success as the Chinese submarine force attains would tend to be infectious and to bolster the professionalism of other components of the modern
PLAN, where newfound pride is thriving as well. The PLA Navy is not fully mature, but it has established its potential for that status in the air, on the sea, and,
conspicuously, under the sea.

NOTES

This article is adapted from a paper delivered
at the Naval War College’s “China’s New Nuclear Submarine Fleet” Research Symposium,
26–27 October 2005.
1. Previously, the author had been told privately
that the PLA was surging in capability because
it finally had the funds from Beijing, the technologies and assistance from Moscow, and the
realization that Washington was not going to
accept Beijing’s position on Taiwan. Prominent in the recent public exchange was the
Chinese response to three events: first, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s complaints about
the large PLA budget, made at a conference
sponsored by the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in Singapore on 4 June 2005;
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second, his similar comments in Beijing in
October 2005; and third, the 2005 annual Department of Defense report to the Congress
on PRC military power. Typical of the
strongly stated disagreement were the widely
noted immediate objection expressed by Cui
Tiankai, top Chinese representative at the
Singapore conference, and the sharp retort of
Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the former
Chinese ambassador in Washington, as
quoted in the Washington Post on 21 July
2005, p. A24. He chastised the United States
for “improper comments about China’s defensive national defense policy and measures”
and called the buildup “normal national defense building.” Yang asserted that most of
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the new spending went for improving living
conditions for troops, noting, rather disingenuously, that the military also “updated some
weapons equipment.”
2. On 4 December 2005, while preparing this article, the author met with two longtime Chinese colleagues, a diplomat (senior foreign
service officer) and a senior PLA Navy officer,
both of them well informed and well connected. They agreed with each other (and unknowingly with American observers) that
conflict with Taiwan and the United States
was unlikely and that cross-Strait relations
were relaxed. The diplomats said that
Beijing’s relaxed attitude stemmed in part
from recently enhanced confidence with respect to political developments in Taipei favorable to Beijing and prospects for eventual
peaceful resolution. They offered no apology
or explanation for the fact that PLA modernization is focused on the Taiwan issue; both
seemed to consider the unprecedented military buildup simply appropriately responsive
to the task of deterring and being able to cope
with China’s most important contingency—
the Taiwan-U.S. “threat.”
3. For a description of this PLA Navy, Air Force,
and 2nd Artillery modernization surge, see
the author’s testimony on Capitol Hill on 15
September 2005 before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
available at www.uscc.org or at www.ifpa.org/
pdf/mcvadon.pdf. For an exhaustive but illuminating description by a non-American
source of the PLAN program, see Mikhail
Barabanov, “Contemporary Military Shipbuilding in China,” Eksport Vooruzheniy, 1
FBIS CEP20050811949014, August 2005. This
piece (perhaps unexpectedly) is a remarkably
accurate and uniquely comprehensive opensource reference on the recent stunning surge
in modernization of the PLAN.
4. U.S. Defense Dept., FY04 Report to Congress
on PRC Military Power (available at www
.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf),
states on page 6: “China has continued to improve its potential for joint operations via development of an integrated command and
control network, a new command structure,
and improved C4ISR platforms. As in previous years, China’s leaders realize that most of
the PLA’s C4ISR equipment lags generations
behind that of the West and are encouraging
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a new generation of researchers, engineers,
and officers to find ways to adapt to the demands of the modern battlefield. The acquisition of advanced C4ISR technology is one of
the principal objectives of PRC collection
activities.”
5. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2002), pp. 32,
46–47. “The PLA is still the party’s army, all
officers above the rank of senior colonel are
party members, and the CCP still institutionally penetrates the military apparatus.” “The
rules of the game . . . have changed as a result
of several developments: [among Shambaugh’s
listed developments]—Increased professionalism in the senior officer corps and a concomitant decline in the promotion of officers
with backgrounds as political commissars.”
6. Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Defense Establishment: The Hard Lessons of Incomplete
Modernization,” in The Lessons of History:
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75,
ed. Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry
M. Wortzel (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, July
2003), p. 33. Godwin states: “Officer recruitment has been changed to an emphasis on
college graduates rather than selecting from
the ranks of serving enlisted men and
women, and advancement in rank now requires attendance at the appropriate PME
schools.”
7. Bernard D. Cole, “The Organization of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),” in
The People’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, ed. James C.
Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), p. 476. “The
PLAN is emulating the U.S. reserve officertraining corps (ROTC) programs for producing
well-educated, technically oriented candidate
officers.”
8. Beijing Xinhua, 17 August 1999, translated in
FBIS-CHI-99-0817: “The Chinese navy plans to
recruit about 1,000 officers from non-military
universities and colleges yearly beginning this
autumn in an effort to meet its need for command and technical talent. . . . [these officers]
will account for 40 percent of all naval officers by the year 2010.” This was originally
cited in Cole, “The Organization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),” p. 477.
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9. Elizabeth Hague, “PLA Leadership in China’s
Military Regions,” in Civil-Military Change in
China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas after the 16th
Party Congress, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry
Wortzel, eds. (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, September
2004), pp. 247, 250. Two extracts from this
chapter illustrate that party loyalty, guanxi
(connections), and a reputation for not rocking the boat remain important in promotion
decisions: “Several military region commanders have been promoted . . . to the national
level. . . . [I]n all cases they involve a candidate
. . . valuable for a national-level position—even
when other factors, such as connections, were a
strong factor in a promotion” [emphasis original]. Further, “Military leaders reflect PLA priorities, even in some cases when what the
leader has to offer is continuity rather than
new ideas or techniques.”
10. The author and another longtime American
specialist on the PLAN were separately told of
these organizational changes by knowledgeable PLAN officers.
11. These exercises with foreign navies consisted
of search-and-rescue drills, communications
exercises, and even replenishment alongside
in at least one case; however, conspicuously
absent were tactical operations. The author
has been told authoritatively that planned or
proposed exercises with Thailand and other
ASEAN countries will also have the goal of
fostering bilateral relations, not of achieving
operational capability.
12. Nikolay Petrov, “Moscow and Beijing Did
Not Mention Their Loses [sic] That They Incurred during the Joint Maneuvers,” Moscow
Kommersant, FBIS CEP20051013330001, 8
September 2005. The following FBIS reports
contain left-handed compliments and question
PLA competence: “Chinese Army’s ‘Iron Discipline’ Impresses Russian Defense Minister,”
Moscow RIA-Novosti, CEP20050825002002,
25 August 2005; “Russia: Results of Joint Military Exercise with China Assessed,” Moscow
Rossiya television, CEP20050927027016, 24
September 2005; “Russian TV Looks at Military
Cooperation with China Post-Exercise,” Moscow Zvezda television, CEP20050919027182, 19
September 2005.
13. “China-Russia: PRC Media on Sino-Russian
Military Exercises Project Image of Converging Interests in Asia,” FBIS Feature,
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FEA20050831007588, 31 August 2005. This
analysis of the August 2005 Russian-Chinese
exercise quotes the principal Chinese and
Russian generals involved as saying the exercise represented “a major strategic decision of
the Russian and Chinese leaders” aimed at
deepening “strategic cooperative partnership”—
a phrase described by the FBIS analyst as normally used to describe bilateral relations.
14. Richard Halloran, “Chinese Sub Highlights
Underseas Rivalries,” Japan Times, 30 November 2004, available at search.japantimes.co.jp/
print/opinion/eo2004/eo20041130a1.htm.
15. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report
to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2005, July 2005, pp. 12–13;
available at www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf. On MRBMs,
see Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile
Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense:
Challenges and Responses,” in China’s Growing
Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic
Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, ed.
Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel
(Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002), p.
113, available at www.strategicstudiesinstitute
.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB59.pdf. The DF-21
family is also called the CSS-5. On SRBMs,
see ibid., p. 116. The DF-15 and DF-11 families are also called the CSS-6 and CSS-7,
respectively.
16. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the
Age of Global Missile Defense,” p. 150 note 12.
17. See Eric A. McVadon, Recent Trends in China’s
Military Modernization, written statement
prepared for testimony before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission,
15 September 2005, available at www.ifpa.org/
pdf/mcvadon.pdf. The information was derived from many translated Chinese articles
during recent years; sources can be identified
for serious researchers.
18. Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Current and Projected
National Security Threats to the United States, statement (excerpted) to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 24 February 2004, available at
www.ransac.org/Official%20Documents/
U.S.%20Government/Intelligence
%20Community/492004113202AM.html.
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19. See Barabanov, “Contemporary Military
Shipbuilding in China,” for an open-source
catalogue of PLAN modernization efforts.
20. John R. Benedict, “The Unraveling and Revitalization of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 2
(Spring 2005). “The recent sale [to China] of
eight additional Project 636 Kilos equipped
with wake-homing antiship torpedoes and
submerged-launch 3M54E Klub-S [the
SS-N-27B] antiship cruise missiles is indicative of the transformation of this submarine
force. The Project 636 Kilo ‘is one of the quietest diesel submarines in the world’ [quoting
the Office of Naval Intelligence]; . . . the Klub-S
missile has a 220-kilometer maximum range . . .
and a terminal speed of up to Mach 3. Such a
capability represents a very formidable threat to
American and allied surface units” (p. 102).
21. “Klub (SS-N-27) ASCM,” Barat Rakshak: The
Consortium of Indian Military Websites, 12
September 2004, www.bharat-rakshak.com/
navy/Klub.html. This and several of the following citations from public sources serve
usefully to describe Chinese acquisitions and
deployments; the varied character of these
sources also illustrates that reasonably accurate
descriptions of the ongoing PLA modernization are publicly available. The problem can be
culling inaccurate reports; the author is often
able to do so by asking knowledgeable PLA
officers and through active exchanges with
other diligent specialists.
22. “Russia to Deliver SS-N-27 to China,” Chinese
Defence Today, 29 April 2005, available at www
.sinodefence.com/news/2005/news29-04-05
.asp.
23. On quietness and sensors, see Zachary Moss,
“Nuclear Submarines Worldwide: Current
Force Structure and Future Developments,”
Bellona Nuclear Naval Vessels, 13 May 2004,
www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/
navy/northern_fleet/vessels/34070.html. On
employment, see Globalsecurity.org, www
.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/
2005/d20050719china.pdf. The U.S. Defense
Department, in its 2005 Annual Report to the
Congress: The Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China, states on page 33: “China is
developing capabilities to achieve local sea
denial, including . . . developing the Type-093
nuclear attack submarine for missions requiring greater at-sea endurance.”
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24. “Yuan Class Diesel-Electric Submarine,” Chinese Defence Today, available at www.sinodefence
.com/navy/sub/yuan.asp. For the Song class,
“Type 039 Song Class Diesel-Electric Submarine,” ibid., www.sinodefence.com/navy/sub/
039.asp.
25. Jing-Dong Yuan, “Chinese Responses to U.S.
Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security,” Nonproliferation
Review (Spring 2003), available at cns.miis.edu/
pubs/npr/vol10/101/101yuan.pdf, p. 89.
26. This is an estimate based on the author’s acquaintance over fifteen years with the PLAN
submarine force and discussions in recent
years with others who have extensive experience concerning that force.
27. With respect to Taiwan’s ASW capability and
potential, the author drew on numerous exchanges with ROC naval officers and thinktankers over many years, including numerous
visits to Taiwan. For judgments on other aspects of the ASW environment, the author relied on his three decades of ASW experience
flying P-2 and P-3 aircraft, the major portion
of which was gained with the U.S. Seventh
Fleet in western Pacific waters.
28. Benedict, “The Unraveling and Revitalization
of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare,” p. 97
fig. 2, where the ASW situation for 2003 is
described as, “Few new ASW sensor &
weapon capabilities fielded to counter diesel
subs in littorals.” Also, on pp. 99–100, the
U.S. Navy vice admiral commanding Atlantic
submarine and ASW forces is quoted as saying, “Our ASW capabilities can best be described as poor or weak,” and the Pacific Fleet
commander as warning, “We will need
greater ASW capability than we have today. . . .
[F]uture technologies are essential to counter
the growing submarine threat.”
29. For the Su-30, Charles R. Smith, “New Chinese Jets Superior, Eagle Loses to Flanker,”
NewsMax.com, 26 May 2004, at www.newsmax
.com/archives/articles/2004/5/26/154053
.shtml. This article illustrates that open
sources were reporting this PLA naval air
force acquisition and its antiship role soon
after its purchase from Russia was consummated: “China is about to receive 24 advanced Sukhoi Su-30MK2 Flanker fighters
from Russia. . . . The new Chinese fighters are
reportedly equipped with enhanced anti-ship
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strike capabilities including the Kh-31 Krypton supersonic anti-ship missile. . . . The PLA
Naval Air Corps will deploy the latest batch
of Su-30MK2 fighters.” For the B-6, Robert S.
Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003,” 2003 Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 59, no. 6 (November/December
2003), pp. 77–80, available at www.thebulletin
.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd03norris.
Using the Chinese designation for B-6—that
is, H-6—this article states: “Although increasingly obsolete as a modern strike
bomber, the H-6 may gain new life as a platform for China’s emerging cruise missile capability. The naval air force has used the H-6
to carry the C-601/Kraken anti-ship cruise
missile for more than 10 years, and Flight International reported in 2000 that up to 25
H-6s would be modified to carry four new
YJ-63 land-attack cruise missiles.” For the
FB-7, see “JH-7 [Jianhong Fighter-Bomber]
[FB-7]/FBC-1,” Globalsecurity.org, 27 April
2005, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
china/jh-7.htm: “China reportedly is developing an improved version of the FB-7. The
twin-engine FB-7 is an all-weather, supersonic, medium-range fighter-bomber with an
anti-ship mission. Improvements to the FB-7
likely will include a better radar, night attack
avionics, and weapons.” For ASCMs, see Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), China’s Cruise
Missile Designations and Characteristics, 26
March 2003, www.nti.org/db/china/
mimport.htm. This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
30. “Naval Forces,” Strategy Page, 20 March
2005, www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsurf/
articles/20050320.aspx. This source states: “The
primary weapon of the Sovremennyy is the
SS-N-22 Sunburn, a high-speed sea-skimming
missile with a huge 660-pound warhead. The
Sunburn is probably the best anti-ship missile
in the world.” This article is cited primarily to
illustrate the widespread reputation of the
Sunburn missile as extremely lethal and
evasive.
31. “Type 052c (Lanzhou Class) Air Defence Missile Destroyer,” Chinese Defence Today, 27
August 2005, available at www.sinodefence
.com/navy/surface/052c.asp: “Jiangnan
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Shipyard started to build two Type 052C destroyers . . . with more advanced weapon systems and sensors specifically for fleet air
defence role. . . . The most notable feature is
the four-array multifunction phased array radar (PAR) similar to the U.S. AN/SPY-1
Aegis system. Additionally, the destroyers are
also fitted with the vertical launch system
(VLS) for the indigenous HQ-9 long-range
air defence missile system.”
32. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission annual report for 2005,
chap. 3, sec. 1, based on testimony of expert
witnesses, available at www.uscc.gov/annual
_report/2005/chapter3_sec1.pdf, states: “The
PLA Navy (PLAN) is engaged in an unprecedented level of construction and acquisition
of major surface combatant ships. It currently
is deploying seven new major ship classes at
one time, building up to two new ships in
each class per year. These include the Project
956 Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG); the Type 52B DDG; the Type
52C, Aegis-like DDG; the Type 54 guidedmissile frigate.”
33. U.S. Defense Dept., FY04 Report to Congress on
PRC Military Power, states on pp. 43–44: “Acquisition of modern ISR systems remains a
critical aspect of Beijing’s military modernization. China is developing its ISR capabilities
based on domestic components, supplemented
by foreign technology acquisition and procurement of complete foreign systems. PLA
procurement of new space systems, AEW [air
early warning] aircraft, long-range UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], and over-the-horizon
radar will enhance its ability to detect, monitor, and target naval activity in the western Pacific Ocean. It appears, from writings on PLA
exercises, that this system currently lacks integration and that a fused, efficient ISR capability will not be achieved for many years.” See
also Richard A. Bitzinger, “Come the Revolution: Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militaries,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 4
(Autumn 2005), pp. 42–43, 46.
34. For the saga of China and aircraft carrier acquisition, see Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s
Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth
from Rumors,” Naval War College Review 57,
no. 1 (Winter 2004).
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